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Abstract
This article provides an exegesis of the recently entered-into-force African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. Democracy has a decidedly mixed history in Africa and, despite a concerted eﬀort
by the African Union (AU), it has made only halting inroads in those states that are nondemocratic or
struggling to consolidate democracy. That may change as more states ratify and implement the Charter,
a comprehensive regional attempt to promote, protect, and consolidate democracy that entered into force
in February 2012. This Charter, the culmination of two decades of African thinking on how democracy
should develop on the continent, represents the AU’s attempt to institutionalize principles of good governance and democratic ideals. Although hurdles remain on Africa’s road to democratic development,
including poverty, illiteracy, and corruption, the Charter provides a means to address these stubborn
problems. Whether it will succeed will depend on state implementation of the obligations undertaken by
ratiﬁcation of the Charter, as well as the AU’s own commitment to ensuring observation of the Charter’s
key provisions. If the AU and its member states do fully implement and practically observe the Charter’s
obligations, then the prospects for democratic governance in Africa have a bright future.
Keywords
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; African Union; democracy; democratization;
development; good governance; human rights

1. Introduction
On January 16, 2012, Cameroon deposited its instrument of ratiﬁcation of the
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (“Charter” or “Democracy Charter”) with the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union,

*) Tel.: (1-202) 305-7232; e-mail: pjg32@law.georgetown.edu. Mr. Glen is an adjunct law professor at
Georgetown University and Senior Litigation Counsel with the U.S. Department of Justice. His writing
on democracy and human rights has appeared in the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post, as well as
numerous academic journals in the USA and Africa.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012

AJLS 5.2_f4_149-176.indd 149

DOI: 10.1163/17087384-12342002

6/14/2012 12:26:24 PM

150

P. J. Glen / African Journal of Legal Studies 5 (2012) 149–175

becoming the ﬁfteenth state to ratify the Charter.1 Per the terms of the Charter, it
thus entered into force on February 15, 2012, thirty days after its ratiﬁcation by
ﬁfteen states.2 Thus far, of the 54 member states of the African Union, 39 have
signed and ﬁfteen have ratiﬁed the Charter.3
Africa provides the perfect laboratory in which to pursue this institutionalization of democracy and democratic ideals, as its governments span all shades along
the democracy spectrum. Despite advances in African democracy since the end of
the Cold War, “the degree of democracy among African states continues to vary
considerably, with authoritarian regimes at one extreme, functional multiparty
systems at the other, and many forms of imperfect democracy in the middle.”4
This range encompasses failed or disintegrating states, such as Somalia and Congo,
countries in a state of ﬂux or transition, like Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, following
the revolutions in those countries, as well as Nigeria, where the aptly named
Goodluck Jonathan is seeking to consolidate democratic gains in the midst of an
increasingly violent religious insurgency, dictatorial regimes, including those in
Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad and Rwanda, and consolidated, functioning democracies, including South Africa, Cape Verde, Botswana, Ghana and Mali.
It is far too early to oﬀer any claim as to whether the Charter will successfully
discharge its primary mission of consolidating, promoting, and protecting democracy. Yet beyond this consideration, the text itself represents a distinct contribution to regional attempts at democratic institutionalization. Although inspired
by the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the African Charter advances a distinctly African conception of how a regional organization can promote, protect,
and advance democratic ideals, and constitutes an important contribution to the
evolving right-to-democracy discourse. This fact should come as little surprise
to many Africa watchers, as the continent has evinced a clear ability to adapt
accepted and emerging international political and legal norms to the speciﬁc circumstances prevailing in Africa. The clearest example of this ingenuity is the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,5 which advanced a conception
of collective peoples’ rights in conjunction with a traditional focus on individual
human rights,6 while also recognizing that individuals not only enjoy rights but
1)
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance, entered into force Feb. 15, 2012,
available at http://www.un.org/democracyfund/Docs/AfricanCharterDemocracy.pdf.
2)
Ibid, Article 48.
3)
See, Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa, AU: Ratiﬁcation status of the African Charter
on Democracy, Elections and Governance, available online at http://www.eisa.org/za/EISA/aucharter.htm
(last visited 23 February 2012).
4)
E. Y. Omorogbe, ‘A Club of Incumbents? The African Union and Coups d’Etat’ (2011) 44(1) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 123–154 at 124 (2011).
5)
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/
LEG/67/3 rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986.
6)
Ibid, Articles 19–24; see Richard N. Kiwanuka, ‘The Meaning of “People” in the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1988) 82(1) American Journal of International Law 80–101.
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also have duties within society that must be observed.7 The Democracy Charter
follows in this tradition by absorbing lessons on democracy promotion and consolidation from other regions, most notably the Americas, and transforming the
received wisdom into a framework speciﬁcally targeted at the problems and issues
prevailing in Africa.
The goal of the instant article is to place the African Charter in its historical
context by noting its antecedents in prior regional declarations and resolutions, as
well as the international collaboration, spearheaded by the Community of
Democracies and then-U.S. Undersecretary of State Paula Dobriansky, that led to
the “birth” of the Charter at the 2003 Dialogue for Democracy. Accordingly, Section I reviews Africa’s history in promoting democracy, consolidating democratic
gains, and protecting democratic regimes from coups d’état and other unconstitutional or extra-constitutional changes in government. Section 2 traces the roots
of the African Charter to the 2003 Dialogue for Democracy, an outgrowth of the
2002 Seoul Ministerial of the Community of Democracies that brought leaders
from Africa and Latin America together in order to share experiences relating to
protecting and promoting democracy. This Dialogue, which also included the
leadership of the Organization of American States, the African Union, and several
prominent civil society and other non-governmental organizations, served as a
signiﬁcant catalyst to the development of the African Charter, and is important
as an example of the inter-regional and public-private sharing of expertise on
democratic practices that has come to characterize democracy advocacy in the
twenty-ﬁrst century.
Moving beyond the history of the Charter, Section 3 reviews the main provisions of the Democracy Charter, while concluding with observations on how the
Charter has advanced a very speciﬁc conception of how democracy should be
promoted and safeguarded in Africa. Finally, Section 4 is forward looking, and
seeks to address oft-repeated concerns about whether democracy can really take
root, on a continent-wide scale, in Africa. The ﬁnal judgment on this issue must
wait the test of time, but the provisions of the Charter, if faithfully and fully
implemented and observed by states, give the continent a fantastic opportunity
to move more countries into the democratic column while permanently relegating the proverbial African “Strong Man” to the annals of history.

7)

Ibid, Articles 27–29; see, U. O. Umozurike, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’
(1983) 77(4) American Journal of International Law 902–912 at 907 (“The Charter breaks new ground
by including individual duties in an international instrument. Hitherto, rights were usually enumerated
that, by implication, imposed duties on states. The Charter, on the other hand, recognizes the duty of the
individual to the family, society, the state, and the international African community.”); M. Wa Mutua,
‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties’
(1995) 35(2) Virginia Journal of International Law 339–380.
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2. Democracy and Good Governance in Africa, Pre-Charter
The Charter represents the culmination of over two decades of thinking on
democracy promotion and consolidation within the institutions of the African
Union and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. Democracy, and
the striving for democratic governance, has long played a central role in how the
OAU and AU have sought to address the problematic issues in African society,
ranging from economic development and poverty alleviation, to increasing literacy and encouraging environmentalism. Although the history of democracy promotion in Africa spans the entirety of the OAU’s existence, this article recounts
only that recent history, beginning with the end of the Cold War.
At the 1990 meeting of the OAU in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the assembled
heads of government issued a Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic
Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World.8
The context of this declaration was the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of
the political union of the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc, and the recognition that
African states would no longer serve proxy roles as hot war zones for the competing ideologies of the United States and Soviet Union.9 Taking center-stage in the
OAU’s concerns was the increasing economic marginalization of Africa and its
need to develop, economically and socially.10 The declaration recognized that
democratic institutions and good governance were a necessary precondition to
the type of economic and societal evolution that was needed if Africa was to take
part in the then-emerging phenomenon of globalization: “We are fully aware that
in order to facilitate this process of socio-economic transformation and integration, it is necessary to promote popular participation of our peoples in the processes of government and development. A permitting political environment
which guarantees human rights and the observance of the rule of law, would
ensure high standards of probity and accountability, particularly on the part of
those who hold public oﬃce. In addition, popular-based political processes would
ensure the involvement of all including in particular women and youth in the
development eﬀorts. We accordingly recommit ourselves to the further democratization of our societies and to the consolidation of democratic institutions in our
countries. We reaﬃrm the right of our countries to determine, in all sovereignty,
their system of democracy on the basis of their socio-cultural values, taking into
account the realities of each of our countries and the necessity to ensure development and satisfy the basic needs of our peoples. We therefore assert that democracy and development should go together and should be mutually reinforcing.”11
8)
OAU, Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African
Unity on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking
Place in the World, OAU Doc. AHG/Decl. 1 (XXVI) (1990).
9)
Ibid, at para. 2.
10)
Ibid, at paras 5–7.
11)
Ibid, at para. 10.
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This declaration served as the basis, ﬁve years later, of the 1995 Cairo Agenda
for Action, an attempt to “relaunch” Africa’s economic and social development.12
Democracy and governance issues again were the central focus in the resolution
establishing the agenda: “We recognize and resolve that democracy, good governance, peace, security, stability, and justice are among the most essential factors in
African socio-economic development. Without democracy and peace, development is not possible; and, without development, peace is not durable.”13 The
Agenda contemplated speciﬁc actions under the rubric of developing democracy
and increasing the levels of good governance, including “launch[ing] programmes
to promote national unity . . . based on the principles of respect for human rights
and dignity, free and fair elections, as well as respect of the freedom of the press,
speech, association and conscience,” and “ensur[ing] the speedy promotion of
good governance, characterized by accountability, probity, transparency, equal
application of the rule of law, and a clear separation of powers, as an objective and
a condition for rapid and sustainable development in African societies.”14
The Cairo Agenda was followed, in 1999, by the so-called Algiers Declaration.15
This declaration reviewed the history of Africa since the end of colonialism, taking stock of what had been accomplished, what remained to be accomplished,
and how best to reach those remaining goals of democratization and development. As with the prior declarations of the OAU, democracy and governance
again play a focal point in determining how to achieve sustainable and permanent
levels of development and how best to create lasting and viable states in Africa:
“We are convinced that the increase in, and expansion of the spaces of freedom
and the establishment of democratic institutions that are representative of our
peoples and receiving their active participation, would further contribute to the
consolidation of modern African States underpinned by the rule of respect for
the fundamental rights and freedom of the citizens and the democratic management of public aﬀairs.”16 The declaration also recalled the 1997 Harare Summit,
held in the wake of the overthrow of the elected government in Sierra Leone,
where the OAU called for the return of constitutional government in that country and called on African states and the international community to deny recognition to the usurping government.17 At Algiers, the OAU “declared that several
governments that had come to power through unconstitutional means since the
Harare summit should restore constitutional legality by the next annual summit
in 2000.”18
12)

Relaunching Africa’s Economic and Social Development: The Cairo Agenda for Action, OAU Doc. AHG/
Res. 236 (XXXI) (1995).
13)
Ibid, at para. 10.
14)
Ibid, at para. 10(a) and 10(b).
15)
Algiers Declaration, OAU Doc. AHG/Decl. 1 (XXXV) (1999).
16)
Ibid, at 5.
17)
Omorogbe, supra note 4, at 127.
18)
Ibid.
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This concern with coups d’état and other unconstitutional changes in government led to the adoption of the Declaration on the Framework for an OAU
Response to Unconstitutional Changes in Government at the 2000 meeting of
the OAU in Lomé, Togo.19 This declaration was precipitated by the “resurgence
of coup d’état in Africa[,] . . . a very disturbing trend and serious setback to the
ongoing process of democratization in the Continent.” The declaration set out a
framework for how the OAU would address an unconstitutional change of government in one of its member states. As a ﬁrst step, the declaration listed a common set of values and principles for democratic governance, including a democratic
constitution, separation of powers and an independent judiciary, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedoms of speech, press,
and expression, political pluralism, and respect for democratic processes.20 It then
proceeded to a non-exhaustive deﬁnition of what would constitute an unconstitutional change in government: “military coup d’état against a democratically
elected Government; intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically
elected Government; replacement of democratically elected Governments by
armed dissident groups and rebel movements; the refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair and regular
elections.”21 If a member state suﬀered an unconstitutional change of government, as contemplated by the declaration, than the OAU was charged with taking certain actions, ranging from the initial condemnation of the change and an
urging to restore constitutional government, a six-month suspension from the
policy organs of the OAU coupled with other potential sanctions, and additional
targeted sanctions should the constitutional government not be restored within
six months.22
The year 2000 was also the year that the African Union took the mantle
from the Organization of African Unity: “in 2000 OAU member states . . .
adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union, intended to replace the
OAU with a more eﬀective organization.”23 The Constitutive Act of the African
Union,24 concerned mainly with establishing the new organizational structure
and its authorities, contained numerous economic and development goals, as
well as objectives related to promoting good governance and the consolidation
and promotion of democracy. The new African Union should promote “peace,
security, and stability on the continent,” “democratic principles and institutions,
19)

OAU Doc. AHG/Decl. 5 (XXXVI) (2000).
Ibid.
21)
Ibid.
22)
Ibid; see generally N. J. Udombana, ‘Articulating the Right to Democratic Governance in Africa’
(2003) 24(4) Michigan Journal of International Law 1209–1287, at 1260–1261.
23)
See, S. J. Schnably, ‘Emerging International Law Constraints on Constitutional Structure and Revision: A Preliminary Appraisal’ (2008) 62(2) University of Miami Law Review 417–490, at 452.
24)
Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/
au/AboutAu/Constitutive_Act_en.htm.
20)
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popular participation and good governance,” and the protection of “human and
peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights and other relevant human rights instruments.”25 The principles of the AU’s
operation also included respect “for democratic principles, human rights, the rule
of law and good governance; . . . Respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and
subversive activities; Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes
of governments.”26 Article 30 of the Act also contained a provision regarding the
suspension of governments from the activities of the AU, if those governments
have “come to power through unconstitutional means.”
The AU quickly took steps to advance the democratization and development
agenda contained in its Constitutive Act. In 2002, the AU issued its Declaration
on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, a response to a report
that recommended “strengthening the role of the AU in election observation and
monitoring and the advancement of the democratization process.”27 This declaration highlighted the importance of free and fair democratic elections to the legitimacy of representative government and the avoidance of conﬂicts.28 Through
it, the member states of the AU undertook to enact the necessary measures to
ensure democratic elections, including adequate election monitoring, women’s
suﬀrage, national electoral bodies to oversee the domestic electoral process, the
guarantee of those basic rights necessary to exercise democratic processes, i.e.,
assembly, speech, and press, and transparency in the electoral process.29 Beyond
these pledges, the declaration also guaranteed the rights of citizens to participate
in democratic elections, as well as to exercise those freedoms necessary to truly
realize a participatory democratic process.30 The declaration is also notable for
requesting a role for the AU in the domestic electoral processes of its member
states through observation and monitoring missions in national elections.31
In 2002 the New Partnership for Africa’s Development also contributed to this
debate, by promulgating its Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and
Corporate Governance.32 This multifaceted declaration “aﬃrmed member states’
commitment to eliminate poverty and promote economic development through
democracy and good governance,” and “committed member states to observe the

25)

Ibid, Articles 3(f )–3(h).
Ibid, articles 4(m), 4(o) and 4(p).
27)
AU Doc. AHG/Decl. 1 at 1 (XXXVIII) (2002).
28)
Ibid, at 2.
29)
Ibid, at 2–3.
30)
Ibid, at 3–4.
31)
Ibid, at 4–5.
32)
New Partnership for Africa’s Development, Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, NEPAD Doc. AHG/235 (XXXVIII), Annex 1 (2002).
26)
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rule of law and maintain strict adherence to the AU’s ban on unconstitutional
changes of government.”33
Finally, again in 2002, the African Union adopted the Protocol Relating to the
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.34 This
protocol was generally concerned with the security and peace of the AU, coordinating a Union-wide response to internal and external threats, and managing and,
where possible, defusing conﬂicts. Yet democracy and rule of law issues are also
presented as objectives and tasks for the Council. Under Article 3, the objectives
for which the Council is established include the promotion and encouragement
of “democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law,” the protection of
“human rights and fundamental freedoms, [and the] respect for the sanctity of
life and international humanitarian law.”35 The protocol contemplates the pursuance of these objectives as furthering the goal of preventing conﬂicts. The Council
was also granted a continuing role in monitoring the pursuit of these objectives.
Article 7 mandates that “the Peace and Security Council shall: . . . (m) followup, within the framework of its conﬂict prevention responsibilities, the progress
towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law,
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of
human life and international humanitarian law by Member States.”36
This cursory review of Africa’s history in promoting the furtherance of democratic governance on the continent makes clear the central focus that the OAU
and AU have placed on developing democratic institutions and governments in
its member states. The application of this framework, however, has not always
led to positive results, and it has not always been applied evenly throughout likesituations. For instance, coups have been treated diﬀerently at diﬀerent times, even
following the adoption of the Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes in
Government. Coups have been denounced by the AU, with an ostensible restoration of constitutional government with little or no further action taken, such as
in Cote d’Ivoire in 1999, Guinea-Bissau in 2003, Tome and Principe in 2003,
and Niger in 2010.37 Coups have led to the suspension of governments from participation in the AU and the restoration of rights upon the holding of elections,
including in the Central African Republic in 2003, Togo in 2005, and Mauritania in 2005 and 2008.38 Certain unconstitutional changes have also been hit with
sanctions beyond suspension, in Guinea in 2008, Madagascar in 2009, and Cote
33)

Schnably, supra note 23, at 454–455.
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, July 10,
2002, available online at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Protocol_peace_
and_security.pdf.
35)
Ibid, Article 3(f ).
36)
Ibid, Article 7(m).
37)
See Omorogbe, supra note 4, at 129, 151–153; N. Petersen, ‘The Principle of Democratic Teleology
in International Law’ (2008) 34(1) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 33–84 at 70.
38)
Omorogbe, supra note 4, at 138–142, 142146, 151–153; Petersen, supra note 37, at 68, 69–70.
34)
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d’Ivoire in 2010.39 And in certain cases, such as the Mauritanian coup in 2005,
coups have been actively denounced and governments suspended, even where the
overthrown government was widely seen as illegitimate or dictatorial, i.e., where
the coup arguably provided an opportunity to advance democratic goals.40
These situations establish that “African regional diplomacy has evolved from
the OAU’s policy of noninterference in the heyday of the Cold War. It is now
demonstrating an increasing willingness to condemn and take action against illegal seizures of power” and “may now be taking a more principled stand on democratically held elections.”41 Nonetheless, the AU has not taken any deﬁnitive or
muscular action in other circumstances, such as the continued rule of Robert
Mugabe in Zimbabwe or the fraudulent and violent elections of 2007 in Kenya,
situations where democracy has been threatened as gravely as in those circumstances where the AU has acted. These contradictions have led one commentator
to conclude that despite a willingness to act in coup situations, “the AU has been
very reluctant to act when it comes to other constitutional infringements such as
falsifying elections, amending constitutions to consolidate more power, or permitting additional terms in oﬃce.”42 Of course, this shortcoming must be taken
in context. The AU, despite continuing discrepancies in how and where it takes a
stand on the protection of democratic governance, has greatly advanced the goals
of good governance and democracy on the continent since the end of the Cold
War. Success is a cumulative process and, despite setbacks or missed opportunities
for action, the AU continues to slowly build towards that ﬁnal success of a completely democratic continent.

3. The Latin America–Africa Democracy Connection
By 2003, the AU had developed a relatively comprehensive patchwork of declarations, Charters, and other Acts regarding the protection, promotion, and consolidation of democracy in Africa. These acts noted the interconnectedness of
democratic governance, economic development, and sustainability, provided
for institutional support in furtherance of the goals of democracy and development, and instituted certain procedures that the Union could take when democracy was threatened in any of its member states. There was, however, no unitary
Charter or Act that addressed all these discrete issues in one text. The push for
what would become the African Democracy Charter developed only in 2003,

39)
Omorogbe, supra note 4, at 146–48, 149–51; T. J. Bassett and S. Straus, ‘Defending Democracy in
Cote d’Ivoire: Africa Takes a Stand’ (2011) 90(4) Foreign Aﬀairs 130–140 at 130.
40)
See Omorogbe, supra note 4 at 142–143; Petersen, supra note 37, at 69–70.
41)
Bassett and Straus, supra note 39, at 140.
42)
Petersen, supra note 37, at 70.
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after an innovative gathering in Coral Gables under the auspices of the Community of Democracies’ Seoul Plan of Action.
The Community of Democracies, an inter-governmental organization composed of democratic countries throughout the world,43 was established in 1999 at
the end of the Clinton Administration.44 At its 2002 Ministerial meeting in Seoul,
the Community issued its “Seoul Plan of Action.”45 This plan dedicated the Community to promoting democratic ideals and transitions through regional and
extra-regional engagements of democratic and transitioning countries.46 The
engagement contemplated by the Plan of Action was meant to take the form of
dialogues, institution building, democracy education, and the development of
regional monitoring and institutional mechanisms to protect and further the
aims of democracy.47
In furtherance of the goals contained in the Plan of Action, a Dialogue for
Democracy was instituted in 2003 in Coral Gables, spearheaded by the eﬀorts of
then-Undersecretary of State for Global Aﬀairs Paula Dobriansky. This conference, the ﬁrst meeting of an ongoing dialogue between the OAS and the AU,
included representatives from the AU and the Organization of American States,
representatives from speciﬁc African and American states, including Cape Verde,
Mali, Botswana, Senegal, Kenya, Ghana, Mozambique, Jamaica, Brazil, Chile,
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Peru and the Dominican Republic, and prominent civil
society and other nongovernmental organizations.48 The discussions of the Dialogue focused on the role the OAS had taken in promoting democracy through
the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and how the AU might be able to undertake a similar role in Africa. Thus, the overarching discussion of the participants
was on how best to promote democratic institutions and practices within regional
frameworks, with a speciﬁc focus on “how regional organizations and coordinated eﬀorts can strengthen democracy, and overcome obstacles and threats to its
development.”49 Yet the broad range of participants also permitted signiﬁcant
discussion on other issues, including good governance, anti-corruption measures,
electoral systems and monitoring, how to bolster civil society, and political party
development.50
43)

See http://www.community-democracies.org.
See M. Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (Hyperion, New York, NY, 2003) 443–447 (noting the
role of then-Secretary of State Albright in the push to create the Community of Democracies).
45)
Community of Democracies, Seoul Plan of Action, Democracy: Investing for Peace and Prosperity
(Nov. 12, 2002).
46)
Ibid.
47)
Ibid.
48)
U.S. State Department, Oﬃce of the Spokesman, Fact Sheet, Dialogue on Democracy (June 3, 2003),
available online at http://statelists.state.gov/script/wa.exe?A2=ind0306aandL=dosfactsandD=1and
P=205.
49)
Ibid.
50)
Ibid.
44)
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The decision to hold a Dialogue where the OAS could share its experiences was
particularly apropos, as the OAS has a strong institutional dedication to promoting, developing, and protecting democratic norms in the Western Hemisphere.
The OAS juridical framework recognizes a “right to democracy,” which has been
enunciated in, inter alia, the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the
Renewal of the Inter-American System and the General Assembly’s statement on
Representative Democracy.51 The OAS had also adopted its own Inter-American
Democratic Charter.52 This document recognized a right of democracy within the
OAS system and that democracy grounds the legitimacy of the Organization,
noted the inextricable link between the promotion and realization of democracy
and the protection of human rights, and the interdependence of democratic
development with socio and economic advancements. The Inter-American Charter also pledged the OAS to strengthen and preserve the democracies of its member states through election monitoring and observation, and provided a mechanism
to address unconstitutional or undemocratic changes in government. Finally, it
also explicitly contemplated a role for civil society and nongovernmental organizations, and mandated that all concerned partners, public and private, would
advance educational programs in civic and democratic values. Accordingly, the
OAS experience provided a rich resource of experience to the AU and its member
states.
The 2003 Dialogue, coupled with the regional impetus created by the Pretoria
Conference on Elections, Democracy and Governance, held in April 2003 in
South Africa, led to the push to create an African Charter on democracy, modeled on the Inter-American experience.53 A commission of “Experts on Elections,
Democracy and Governance” was formed, and, in 2004, was called upon to
draft the African Charter.54 The Charter was adopted three years later in 2007,
at the Ninth Summit of the African Union in Addis Ababa.55 Signatures and
ratiﬁcations of the Charter were not, however, forthcoming, and the Commission of the African Union had to issue a resolution calling upon states to ratify
later that year.56 Even by “July 2010, only three states (Ethiopia, Mauritania and
Sierra Leone) had” ratiﬁed the Charter.57 The Charter only entered into force in
51)
See The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of The Inter-American System, OAS General
Assembly, 3rd Plenary Session (adopted June 4, 1991), OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/XXI.O.2 (1991); Representative Democracy, OAS General Assembly, 5th Plen. Sess. (adopted June 5, 1991), AG/Res.1080 (XXI0/91), OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/XXI.O.2 (1991); see also, P. J. Glen, ‘The ADVANCE Democracy Act and
the Future of United States Democracy Promotion Eﬀorts’ (2011) 9(2) Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 273–308 at 302.
52)
Inter-American Democratic Charter, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/Res.1 (Sept. 11, 2001).
53)
See AU Doc. EX.CL/Dec. 31 (III) (2003).
54)
See AU Doc. EX.CL/124 (V) (2004).
55)
See, R. Murray, ‘Recent Developments in the African Human Rights System 2007’ (2008) 8(2)
Human Rights Law Review 356–376 at 361–362.
56)
Ibid, at 362.
57)
Omorogbe, supra note 4, at 135.
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February 2012, upon the ratiﬁcation of the ﬁfteenth state, Cameroon, a delay of
nearly ﬁve years from adoption to entry into force.

4. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
This section has two purposes. First, it reviews the text of the African Charter
chapter by chapter, in order to give a comprehensive picture of the obligations
undertaken by member states and the mechanisms the Charter puts into place for
dealing with elections, unconstitutional changes in government, and other related
issues. Second, following this exegesis of the Charter, the section concludes by
noting how the text has advanced an important conception of how a regional
body can promote, protect, and consolidate democracy. Although rooted, in
some ways, in the Inter-American Charter, the African Charter stands alone in its
ﬁnal conception as a text speciﬁc to Africa. Nonetheless, the ideas and concepts
contained therein should have wide circulation within the democracy promotion
community, as the Charter represents a very robust ideal of what is necessary to
truly realize democracy within both autocratic and transitioning countries.
4.1. Preliminary Considerations: The Objective and Principles of the Charter
As Section 1 of this article established, there is a strong institutional history of
protecting and promoting democracy within the African regional system. The
Preamble of the Charter recognizes this and grounds itself in the existing human
rights and democracy order by reference to this history, including the Algiers
and Lomé Declarations, the Cairo Agenda, and the relevant articles of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.58 The Preamble also notes its goals with speciﬁc choices in language related to the institutionalization and entrenchment of
democratic principles. It seeks to “entrench in the Continent a political culture
of change of power based on the holding of regular, free, fair and transparent
elections conducted by competent, independent and impartial national electoral bodies.”59 It is determined “to promote and strengthen good governance
through the institutionalization of transparency, accountability and participatory
democracy.”60 Most importantly, perhaps, the ideals contained in the Charter are
deemed universal, and thus as wholly applicable in Africa as they are in any existing Western democracy.61
The substantive portion of the Charter begins with twin articles on the “Objectives” sought to be advanced and the “Principles” that should guide state imple58)

African Charter, preamble.
Ibid (emphasis added).
60)
Ibid (emphasis added).
61)
Ibid (“Committed to promote the universal values and principles of democracy, good governance,
human rights and the right to development”).
59)
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mentation of the obligations under the Charter. The second article lists thirteen
discrete objectives which address not only the building and consolidation of
democracy, but other hoped-for beneﬁts that would ﬂow from that institution
building, including objectives related to development and the harmonization of
law and policy across diﬀerent states. The objectives are: “1) Promote adherence . . . to the universal values and principles of democracy and respect for human
rights; 2) Promote and enhance adherence to the principle of the rule of law premised upon the respect for, and the supremacy of, the Constitution and constitutional order in the political arrangements of the State Parties; 3) Promote the
holding of regular free and fair elections to institutionalize legitimate authority of
representative government as well as democratic change of governments; 4) Prohibit, reject and condemn unconstitutional change of government in any Member State as a serious threat to stability, peace, security and development;
5) Promote and protect the independence of the judiciary; 6) Nurture, support
and consolidate good governance by promoting democratic culture and practice,
building and strengthening governance institutions and inculcating political pluralism and tolerance; 7) Encourage eﬀective coordination and harmonization of
governance policies amongst State Parties with the aim of promoting regional and
continental integration; 8) Promote State Parties’ sustainable development and
human security; 9) Promote the ﬁght against corruption []; 10) Promote the
establishment of the necessary conditions to foster citizen participation, transparency, access to information, freedom of the press and accountability in the management of public aﬀairs; 11) Promote gender balance and equality in the
governance and development processes; 12) Enhance cooperation between the
Union, Regional Economic Communities and the International Community on
democracy, elections and governance; and 13) Promote best practices in the management of elections for purposes of political stability and good governance.”62
Article 3 contains eleven principles that should guide pursuance of the Charter’s objectives and the state’s implementation of its obligations, and these
enumerated principles constitute the bedrock of the liberal democratic order:
“1) Respect for human rights and democratic principles; 2) Access to and exercise
of state power in accordance with the constitution of the State Party and the
principle of the rule of law; 3) Promotion of a system of government that is representative; 4) Holding of regular, transparent, free and fair elections; 5) Separation of powers; 6) Promotion of gender equality in public and private institutions;
7) Eﬀective participation of citizens in democratic and development processes
and in governance of public aﬀairs; 8) Transparency and fairness in the management of public aﬀairs; 9) Condemnation and rejection of acts of corruption,
related oﬀenses and impunity; 10) Condemnation and total rejection of unconstitutional changes of government; 11) Strengthening political pluralism and
62)

Ibid, Article 2.
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recognizing the role, rights and responsibilities of legally constituted political parties, including opposition political parties, which should be given a status under
national law.”63
4.2. Promoting Democracy by Protecting Human Rights, and Vice Versa
Chapter 4 of the Charter, captioned “Democracy, Rule of Law and Human
Rights,” focuses on constitutionalism and the protection of certain human rights
deemed necessary for the full enjoyment of democracy. Linking democracy and
human rights in this manner has roots in the Inter-American Charter and the
African instruments noted in Section I,64 yet the African Charter’s adoption of
this stance still constitutes an important institutionalization of this view. The
justiﬁcation for this linkage is succinctly stated in the Charter itself, which obligates the state parties to “protect the right to equality before the law and equal
protection by the law as a fundamental precondition for a just and democratic
society.”65 In essence, the Charter recognizes that the protection of certain rights
and freedoms must ground any stable democracy, and that stable democracy is
necessary for the enjoyment of the full panoply of human rights and freedoms.
Regarding the principle of constitutionalism, the Charter mandates constitutional rule and constitutional transfers of power,66 the “entrench[ment of ] the
principle of the supremacy of the constitution in the political organization of the
States,”67 and that any constitutional revisions or amendments should be by
national consensus, preferably by referenda.68
On the issue of human rights, Article 4 obligates states to promote not only
democracy, but also the rule of law and human rights, while mandating universal
suﬀrage.69 States must also eliminate discrimination while promoting equality
and diversity in political and public life,70 and guarantee to the populace its fundamental rights and freedoms.71 The Charter also encourages the states of the
African Union to strengthen and support those AU institutions charged with
protecting and promoting human rights.72
4.3. Institutional and Societal Reforms
Along with its linkage of democracy promotion and consolidation with respect
for and protection of human rights, the Charter also advances a broad conception
63)
64)
65)
66)
67)
68)
69)
70)
71)
72)

Ibid, Article 3.
See, e.g., Inter-American Charter, Articles 7–10.
African Charter, Article 10(3).
Ibid, Article 5.
Ibid, Article 10(1).
Ibid, Article 10(2).
Ibid, Article 4.
Ibid, Article 8.
Ibid, Article 6.
Ibid, Article 7.
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of institutional and societal reforms which it contemplates as the foundation for
healthy democratic governance. To this end, Chapters 5 and 6 of the Charter
address the underlying conditions that must prevail in order for democracy to
ﬂourish, the measures needed to develop a societal culture that is conducive to
democratic governance, and how to ensure that there are institutional supports
to the conduct and promotion of democracy. Article 11 broadly mandates states
to implement legislative and policy initiatives to “strengthen a culture of democracy and peace,” while Articles 12 and 13 more speciﬁcally require programs and
policies to ensure transparency in governance, create political space for civil society, and encourage civic education, and obligates states to implement measures
that would create consistent dialogue between political leaders and the people in
furtherance of the goal of transparency.
Institutionally, Article 14 requires African states to adopt what is a hallmark of
Western democracies, civilian control over military and security forces. This article also obligates states to enact domestic mechanisms to hold accountable those
who attempt to take political power through unconstitutional means, and to
cooperate amongst other AU members to forestall, where possible, such unconstitutional changes.73 Article 15 directs states to create public institutions to promote and advance democracy and constitutional order, while Article 16 encourages
cooperation between states through the sharing of their experiences in building
and consolidating democracy.
4.4. Guaranteeing Free, Fair and Transparent Elections
The electoral process is the focus of the Charter’s following Chapter. The Charter
“reaﬃrms” the commitment of African countries to hold free, fair, transparent,
and regular elections,74 while seeking the establishment or strengthening of
national electoral bodies, mechanisms to settle contested elections, free and equal
access for all candidates to media outlets, and a code to govern the conduct of
elections, including processes for post-election issue.75 This chapter also requires
states to provide “a conducive environment for independent and impartial
national monitoring or observation mechanisms.”76
Beyond the steps that state parties must undertake domestically, the Charter
also envisions a potentially prominent role for the African Commission in national
electoral processes. AU members may appeal to the Commission for expertise and
ﬁnancial assistance in strengthening and developing the requesting state’s electoral-related institutions.77 The Commission also must be informed of scheduled
elections and invited to send an observer mission, which must enjoy “conditions
73)
74)
75)
76)
77)

Ibid, Article 14.
Ibid, Article 17.
Ibid, Article 17(1)–17(4).
Ibid, Article 22.
Ibid, Article 18.
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of security, free access to information, non-interference, freedom of movement
and full cooperation.”78 An “exploratory mission” under the auspices of the Commission should also pre-date any election, and should deduce “whether the necessary conditions have been established and if the environment is conducive to the
holding of transparent, free and fair elections in conformity with the principles of
the Union governing democratic elections.”79 The Charter also endows the Commission with certain responsibilities in relation to its electoral monitoring role,
designed to enhance its legitimacy in acting as an observer of domestic elections.
Its missions must be impartial and endowed with suﬃcient resources to discharge
their functions,80 they must be comprised of relevant experts drawn from national
electoral bodies, regional bodies, and Pan-African institutions, with concerns of
gender and regional equality of representation taken into account,81 they “shall be
conducted in an objective, impartial and transparent manner,”82 and shall timely
submit a report to the Commission and the concerned state of its ﬁndings.83
4.5. Protecting Democracy: The Charter’s Provisions on Unconstitutional Changes in
Government
The Charter also institutionalizes the framework for addressing unconstitutional
changes in government ﬁrst enunciated in the Lomé Declaration. First, the Charter lists those circumstances that will constitute an “actionable” unconstitutional
change of government.84 This list substantially duplicates the four scenarios that
are contained in the Lomé Declaration, but also adds a ﬁfth situation: “Any
amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an
infringement on the principles of democratic change of government.”85 The text
of Article 23 also makes clear that the scenarios explicitly mentioned are not
exhaustive of what could constitute an unconstitutional change of government.86
Articles 24–26 focus on the mechanisms of sanction and suspension, and place
the primary African Union response in the hands of the Peace and Security Council, a body created after the Lomé Declaration. Article 24 permits the Peace and
Security Council to act, consistent with its functions and establishing protocol,
“[w]hen a situation arises in a State Party that may aﬀect its democratic political
institutional arrangements or the legitimate exercise of power[.]” Article 25 is
speciﬁcally concerned with the escalating course of sanctions that the AU may
78)
79)
80)
81)
82)
83)
84)
85)
86)

Ibid, Article 19.
Ibid, Article 20.
Ibid, Article 21(1).
Ibid, Article 21(2).
Ibid, Article 21(3).
Ibid, Article 21(4) and 21(5).
See, ibid, Article 23.
Ibid, Article 23(5).
See, ibid, Article 23 (“State Parties agree that the use of, inter alia, the following illegal means . . .”).
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undertake against an illegal regime that proves recalcitrant. First, if diplomatic
initiatives for the restoration of constitutional government fail, the illegal regime
will be suspended from participation in the organs and activities of the Union,
although this suspension will not relieve the suspended state from its obligations
to fulﬁll its commitments to the Union, including the protection of human
rights.87 Moreover, the AU and other states will maintain diplomatic contact with
the oﬀending state in order to further pursue a peaceable resolution to the situation.88 Beyond suspension, the Charter permits additional sanctions to be imposed
upon the illegal government, including economic sanctions,89 and also contemplates the extension of sanctions to third-party states that encourage or assist in
an unconstitutional change in another government.90 Subsection four also institutionalizes a practice that had begun to be common in applying the Lomé
Declaration, by disallowing the perpetrators of unconstitutional changes in government to stand in the elections to be held upon the subsequent restoration of
democracy.91 The inclusion of this provision makes clear that there will be no
rewards for instituting unconstitutional changes in government.
Beyond the sanctions mechanism of Article 25, the Charter also breaks new
ground by contemplating a juridical response to an unconstitutional change in
government. The “[p]erpetrators of unconstitutional change of government may
also be tried before the competent court of the Union,”92 domestic governments
have an obligation to bring those perpetrators to justice or extradite them to a
willing prosecutor,93 and, to further this goal, bilateral treaties on extradition and
mutual legal assistance should be pursued.94
4.6. Implementing Good Political, Economic and Social Governance
One of the most innovative aspects of the Charter is its attempt to ground democracy in a solid social, political and economic order. As with its linkage of democracy and human rights, the Charter contemplates broad reforms on economic
and social issues as necessary to the full protection and institutionalization of
democratic governance on the continent. The Charter’s Chapter on these issues
begins by addressing a broad array of concerns at the foundation of society
that must be addressed in order “to advance political, economic and social
governance.”95 States must commit themselves to: “1) Strengthening the capacity
87)
88)
89)
90)
91)
92)
93)
94)
95)

Ibid, Article 25(1) and 25(2).
Ibid, Article 25(3).
Ibid, Article 25(7).
Ibid, Article 25(6).
Ibid, Article 25(4).
Ibid, Article 25(5).
Ibid, Article 25(9).
Ibid, Article 25(10).
Ibid, Article 27.
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of parliaments and legally recognized political parties to perform their core
functions; 2) Fostering popular participation and partnership with civil society
organizations; 3) Undertaking regular reforms of the legal and justice systems;
4) Improving public sector management; 5) Improving eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of public services and combating corruption; 6) Promoting the development
of the private sector through, inter alia, enabling legislative and regulatory framework; 7) Development and utilization [sic] of information and communication
technologies; 8) Promoting freedom of expression, in particular freedom of the
press and fostering a professional media; 9) Harnessing the democratic values of
the traditional institutions; and 10) Preventing the spread and combating the
impact of diseases such as Malaria, Tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, Ebola fever, and
Avian Flu.”96
The Charter also recognizes the importance of dialogue and partnerships
between all components of society, including between public and private sectors,
and civil society, and encourages interactions between these diﬀerent groups as a
way to further the goals of democratic governance.97 A broad inclusion within
this dialogue is also important, and the Charter contains speciﬁc provisions mandating the inclusion within the political sphere of groups traditionally left on the
outside looking in, including women, youth, and the disabled.98
Beyond general principles, the Charter focuses speciﬁcally on those areas
that must undergird responsible and just governance, both political and economic. States must institutionalize principles of good governance, including:
“1) Accountable, eﬃcient and eﬀective public administration; 2) Strengthening
the functioning and eﬀectiveness of parliaments; 3) An independent judiciary;
4) Relevant reforms of public institutions including the security sector; 5) Harmonious relationships in society including civil-military relations; 6) Consolidating sustainable multiparty political systems; 7) Organising [sic] regular, free and
fair elections; and 8) Entrenching and respecting the principle of the rule of law.”99
Economic and corporate governance also must be reformed consistent with certain
guiding principles, including: “1) Eﬀective and eﬃcient public sector management; 2) Promoting transparency in public ﬁnance management; 3) Preventing
and combating corruption and related oﬀences; 4) Eﬃcient management of public debt; 5) Prudent and sustainable utilization of public resources; 6) Equitable
allocation of the nation’s wealth and natural resources; 7) Poverty alleviation;
8) Enabling legislative and regulatory framework for private sector development;
9) Providing a conducive environment for foreign capital inﬂows; 10) Developing tax policies that encourage investment; 11) Preventing and combating crime;
12) Elaborating and implementing economic development strategies including
96)
97)
98)
99)

Ibid.
Ibid, Article 28.
See, ibid, Articles 29–31.
Ibid, Article 32.
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private-public sector partnerships; 13) An eﬃcient and eﬀective tax system premised upon transparency and accountability.”100
The national government and AU will certainly have a role in the institutionalization of these principles, but the Charter also seeks to intimately involve local
governments and other sub-national government bodies in this process. To this
end, the Charter seeks a decentralization of authority and political power to
“democratically elected local authorities,” which will, in turn, grant them a signiﬁcant stake in ensuring the success of these provisions.101 Likewise, the Charter
also recognizes the ongoing importance of traditional governance and judicial
mechanisms in Africa, and the role they might be able to play in developing and
promoting democratic governance within states: “Given the enduring and vital
role of traditional authorities, particularly in rural communities, the State Parties
shall strive to ﬁnd appropriate ways and means to increase their integration and
eﬀectiveness within the larger democratic society.”102
The Charter further obligates states to take measures on other social issues,
including the promotion of free, universal, and compulsory primary education,103
improving literacy rates,104 increasing access to basic social services,105 the protection of the environment,106 alleviation of poverty,107 and the implementation of
health programs to combat the scourges of disease in Africa.108 The Charter also
recommits its signatories to the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals,
sustainable development, and the NEPAD’s Declaration on Development and
Democracy.109
4.7. Provisions on Application, Implementation and Mechanics
The concluding provisions of the Charter address issues relating to the implementation of its obligations and how those provisions should be applied. State parties
to the Charter undertake to implement the necessary domestic legislation and
regulation to fulﬁll the objectives, principles, and commitments contained in the
text.110 The African Commission is also charged with a primary role in seeing that
the Charter is fully implemented and observed,111 undertakes the responsibility to

100)
101)
102)
103)
104)
105)
106)
107)
108)
109)
110)
111)

Ibid, Article 33.
See, ibid, Article 34.
Ibid, Article 35.
Ibid, Article 43.
Ibid.
Ibid, Article 41.
Ibid, Article 42.
Ibid, Article 40.
Ibid.
Ibid, Articles 36 and 37.
Ibid, Article 44(1).
Ibid, Article 45.
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oﬀer any necessary support to states in implementing the Charter’s provision,112
and is required to establish a framework for coordination and cooperation on
democracy issues with the Regional Economic Communities.113 Violations of the
Charter, and what actions to be taken against violators, is to be determined by the
AU Assembly in coordination with the Peace and Security Council.114
State parties are obligated to provide periodic reports to the African Commission detailing their progress towards their implementation of the Charter’s obligations, and the Commission itself will assess the progress made and determine
what additional steps could be taken.115 On an evolutionary note, the Charter
also contains a mechanism by which amendments or revisions to the Charter can
be proposed, ratiﬁed, and implemented.116 Finally, the Charter itself recognizes
that the obligations contained therein are only a baseline of obligations, and that
states may more fully guarantee or protect democratic ideals, i.e., existing provisions that are more favorable to democracy or more fully advance economic,
social, and political goals, will not be displaced by a state’s obligations under the
Charter.117
4.8. Assessing the Import of the Charter: A Step Forward for Africa and the
International Democracy Community
This section began by noting that the African Charter on Democracy is ﬁrmly
grounded in the long-standing commitment to democratic governance evidenced
by the various declarations and resolutions the OAU and AU have advanced in
the preceding two decades. The Charter is, to an extent, an institutionalization of
those antecedents, but it is also an advancement beyond the terms of those prior
instruments. It is also ﬁrmly rooted in the exchange of experiences and views at
the 2003 Dialogue for Democracy, yet the Charter is also more than an adaptation of the Inter-American Charter to the prevailing situation in Africa. Thus,
despite its historical grounding, the African Charter is a text that stands alone in
its comprehensive approach to the promotion, protection and consolidation of
democracy.
First, the Charter contains a broader conception of what will constitute an
“unconstitutional change” in government, and this language hopefully signals an
intent to more actively pursue autocrats that hold power through unconstitutional means, such as by the elimination of term limits or the manipulation of
elections, not just those who come to power through coups d’état. Moreover,
with the advent of the Peace and Security Council, the Charter wisely places
112)
113)
114)
115)
116)
117)

Ibid, Article 44(a)(2)(A).
Ibid, Article 44(a)(2)(B).
Ibid, Article 46.
Ibid, Article 49.
Ibid, Article 50.
Ibid, Article 52.
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determinations of the actions to be taken in the hands of that body. This furthers
the institutional goals of both the Council and the Charter, by endowing that
institution with real authority to craft sanctions and other coercive actions to
forestall an unconstitutional change in government or to restore democratic
governance.
Second, the Charter is heavily focused on constitutionalism, grounding state
authority in written constitutions and binding future action by that constitution.
This goes beyond simply prohibiting unconstitutional changes in government. As
one commentator has written, “[i]n two ways [the Charter] addresses issues of
constitutional ﬁdelity that go beyond unconstitutional changes of government. It
attempts to specify the fundamental role of a constitution within a state, requiring AU members to ‘entrench the principle of the supremacy of the constitution
in the political organization of the State.’ And it requires that no amendment or
revision of a constitution be made except on the basis of ‘consensus,’ and places
special emphasis on referenda as the vehicle for amendment.”118 This ensures that
the fundamental law of the state is known, and that it can only be changed in
accordance with agreed upon terms. The whims of a sitting autocrat are insuﬃcient to eﬀect this change, and if the attempt is made to alter the constitutional
scheme of the state, that will provide grounds for suspension or sanctions by the
AU against the oﬀender.
Third, both of these preceding observations support the assertion that the AU
and its member states are increasingly moving away from a conception of sovereignty that will bar outside intervention in all circumstances.119 For instance, the
Charter contemplates an activist role for the Peace and Security Council in not
only restoring democratic governance, but also in ceasing any moves towards an
unconstitutional change in government. Additionally, the African Commission is
granted a signiﬁcant role in observing and monitoring elections, as well as in
determining whether the pre-conditions for a democratic election have been met
even prior to the holding of a domestic election. These provisions, and others like
them, indicate that the domestic governance of African states is a matter of continent-wide concern, and because of this conception of the importance of governance all African states, including the super-national institutions of the AU, have
a real interest with whether democracy prevails in a given member state.
Fourth, in contemplating legal and judicial action against individuals who
incite or eﬀectuate an unconstitutional change in government, the Charter moves
boldly forward in the area of international criminal law. The Charter speciﬁcally
envisions the referral to the appropriate AU judicial tribunal, likely the African
Court of Justice and Human Rights, of the perpetrators of an unconstitutional
118)

Schnably, supra note 23, at 456–457.
See, e.g., Bassett and Straus, supra note 39, at 140 (noting the shift of the AU away from the principle
of noninterference).

119)
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change in government. The Charter does not state what the crime would be, or
on what charges the individual could be indicted, but there are stirrings in the
international justice community of establishing a “crime against democracy” or a
“crime of dictatorship.”120 By conceiving of infringements of constitutional governance as crimes or legal violations, the Charter thus lays the groundwork for
pursuing autocrats and dictators for the political crimes they commit, not merely
the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity that they are well-known
for perpetrating.
Fifth, by linking the promotion and consolidation of democracy with the protection of human rights, and by seeking to ground democratic governance in a
reformed economic, social and political space, the Charter innovatively advances
the thinking on the interrelatedness of these pressing issues. Literature linking
democracy with certain levels of development has a chicken-and-the-egg feel –
does development lead to democracy, or does democracy contribute to development – but the Charter ignores this question in favor of policies advancing both.
This is a practical application of the realization that there is some link between
economic development and democracy, and, whatever that link is, both goals
may be realized and pursued simultaneously. If democratic governance is realized,
development can more easily ensue, and if development is advanced, democratic
governance can begin to grow. The Charter also and importantly advances purely
social issues, including poverty alleviation, education and literacy, and health
care, based on the assumption that democratic governance can only be pursued
when certain social conditions prevail. The population must be educated on how
democracy works and what rights and obligations they share, they must be wellfed in order to care about political participation rather than simply where the
next meal is coming from, and they must not be decimated by disease. These
social, cultural, and economic conditions are at the root of the question of good
governance, and unless progress is made along those lines, democratic governance
cannot be realized on a broad scale.
The Charter’s linkage of democracy with human rights has ﬁrm roots in the
Inter-American Charter,121 yet it is important for democracy advocates to keep
pushing this idea. There is a prevailing view that governance issues and human
rights are two distinct problems meant to be addressed separately. Where democracy and governance organizations pour money into institutional ﬁxes, election
monitoring, or strengthening civil society groups, human rights groups seek
redress on an ad hoc basis of violations of human rights and other fundamental
freedoms. Yet democracy and human rights are intimately linked, as the Charter
120)
See, P. J. Glen, ‘Towards the Criminalization of Dictatorship: A Draft Proposal for an International
Convention on Dictatorship’ (2008) 14(1) Buﬀalo Human Rights Law Review 15–49; Glen, supra note
51, at 303–304; see also M. Palmer and P. Glen, ‘The Crime of Dictatorship’ (28 Sept. 2011) The Washington Post A15.
121)
See, Inter-American Charter, Articles 7–10.
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recognizes. Democratic countries do, concededly, have their fair share of problems, and no country has an absolutely perfect record on the protection of human
rights, but those rights and freedoms that have become sacrosanct in international law are far more fully protected and guaranteed in countries with good
governance. It is autocrats and dictators that commit human rights abuses, not
democracies, and so by sowing the seeds of good governance and democratic
reform the Charter, and other instruments like it, seeks to create an environment
where human rights can be more fully enjoyed. Likewise, the progressive enjoyment of human rights, including the freedoms of association and speech, contribute to situations where democratic governance can emerge from within closed
societies, a fact to which the Arab Spring clearly testiﬁes. In short, linking human
rights with democracy is a necessary shift in thinking and one that will advance
the goals of both programs more fully than if each continues to take its own road
independent of the other.
Finally, the Charter’s focus on traditional political authority is important and
demonstrates an ability to synthesize prevailing conceptions of how democracy
should work with emerging democratic thinking in parts of the world that share
a diﬀerent social and political heritage. The Charter guarantees all the bedrocks of
liberal democratic order, but also encourages states to include other traditions
within the ﬁnally realized democracy of that state. These could range from tribal
councils or networks of families, to socio-juridical institutions, such as the gacaca
in Rwanda,122 the palaver huts of Liberia,123 or the use of curandeiros in Mozambique.124 This attempt at synthesis exposes the lie that democracy must be a one
size ﬁts all proposition, and could represent a framework for how other currently
non-democratic states or regions approach the question of democratization. In
any event, by placing the democratization process within the speciﬁcally African
historical and social experience, the Charter increases the likelihood that good
governance and inclusive democracy can arise.

122)
See, E. Daly, ‘Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda’ (2002)
34(2) N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 355–396; M. Goldstein-Bolocan, ‘Rwandan
Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional Justice’ (2005) 2004(2) Journal of Dispute Resolution 355–400;
J. Fierens, ‘Gacaca Courts: Between Fantasy and Reality’ (2005) 3(4) Journal of International Criminal
Justice 896–919; P. Clark, ‘Hybridity, Holism, and “Traditional” Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts
in Post-Genocide Rwanda’ (2007) 39(4) George Washington International Law Review 765–838; C. J. Le
Mon, ‘Rwanda’s Troubled Gacaca Courts’ (2007) 14(2) Human Rights Brief 16–20.
123)
See, A. E. Gerencser, ‘Family Mediation: Screening for Domestic Abuse’ (1995) 23(1) Florida State
University Law Review 43–70 at 48, n. 22.
124)
See, P. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (Routledge, New York, NY,
2001) 192–195; L. Waldorf, ‘Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional
Justice’ (2006) 79(1) Temple Law Review 1–88 at 18.
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5. The Future of Democracy in Africa
The true measure of success is not a pure innovativeness in thinking or the endless
proliferation of hortatory statements on democracy, but whether a stated course
of action has borne fruit. Has the democracy agenda done that in Africa? The
results are mixed. Democracy has made inroads in several countries, and the continent is freer and more democratic one decade into the 21st century than it was
at the close of the Cold War, but it is also still a haven of instability and autocracy.
Writing in 2011, Charles Fombad, a legal scholar at the University of Pretoria,
took stock of this mixed heritage: “[I]t can be said that the AU democracy agenda
is today one of the boldest and most daring initiatives that the leaders of the continent have ever embarked on. The record so far has been neither good nor
encouraging. Although the Constitutive Act and the various instruments provide
a solid framework for peer pressure to be brought to inﬂuence constitutional
developments on the continent, the inability of the AU to deal with the situations
in Sudan, Somalia, and Zimbabwe raises serious doubts about the agenda’s credibility. The AU agenda on democracy and good governance reminds one of the
‘proverbial dog that danced on its hind legs, the signiﬁcance of which lies less in
how well it danced and more on the fact that it could dance at all.’ The mere
recognition by African leaders that democracy and good governance is critical to
the continent’s recovery and survival is a giant step in the right direction.”125
Whether the African Charter will represent a tipping point in the evolution of
African democratization, past which greater and more signiﬁcant gains can be
realized, will depend on how the Charter is implemented and how speciﬁcally it
addresses the systemic concerns that have hampered earlier attempts at democracy promotion and consolidation.
The challenges to democratization on the continent have been well-parsed.
These include a lack of competent institutions, poverty and illiteracy, corruption,
and a political culture of exclusivity. Each challenge poses discrete problems to
the goal of democratization.
Institution and capacity building is a primary concern. African states must
“develop and strengthen competent institutions of democracy, such as the media,
judiciary, civil service, electoral systems, independent commissions, and educational institutions. These and similar institutions implement policies that are necessary to democracy and development.”126 In many African states these institutions
are lacking and, where they do exist, they have become “dysfunctional . . . largely
due to neglect.”127 Yet without a vibrant civil society, an independent judiciary,
independent electoral bodies, and free and uncensored media outlets, democracy
125)
C. M. Fombad, ‘Constitutional Reforms and Constitutionalism in Africa: Reﬂections on Some Current Challenges and Future Prospects’ (2011) 59(4) Buﬀalo Law Review 1007–1108 at 1098–1099.
126)
Udombana, supra note 22, at 1271–1272.
127)
Ibid, at 1272.
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and development cannot advance and cannot be consolidated. Electoral monitoring ensures free and fair elections, while independent judiciaries can hold public
ﬁgures accountable without fears of professional reprisals. An independent and
free media must be realized to ensure informed voting, and civil society must be
encouraged and nurtured so that democracy does not become simply the purview
of a new elite. These and other institutions are indispensable to the enjoyment of
a democratic culture, and until they are developed and strengthened democracy
in Africa will be only a dream.
Coupled with institution building is the need to eradicate public cultures of
corruption. “Corruption is endemic in Africa and is the deﬁning feature of its
governance.”128 Corruption undermines the independence of public institutions
and makes governmental decisions depend not on the equal application of known
standards, but on backroom deals made to beneﬁt an already entrenched elite.
Governmental decisions must be open, transparent, and made pursuant to scrupulously applied and generally known standards. Democracy requires this form
of decision-making, and corruption can only undermine nascent democracies
and contribute to a crisis of faith in whether the substance of a decision is based
on relevant criteria or an impermissible quid pro quo. Thus, “[t]he democratization of the continent will be a mirage unless the AU wages a concerted crusade
against corruption.”129
Beneath both of these issues are rampant poverty, illiteracy, and lack of compulsory education. “[P]overty is a great hindrance to democracy and the enjoyment of human rights. Poverty leaves many people susceptible to manipulations
by several forces and interests. Democracy will not thrive in instability or under
conditions of excruciating and humiliating poverty.”130 Beyond the opportunity
to manipulate those in need, a lack of education and illiteracy means that citizens
cannot meaningfully take part in those democratic processes that do exist. Choice
cannot be exercised in a knowing and intelligent manner in circumstances where
the populace does not understand or properly conceive of the ends to which the
state should be working. This lack of civic education and literacy also leaves the
populace open to the harangues of demagogues and the risks of a divisive populism. Most fundamentally, perhaps, is the old canard that nobody cares about
democracy on an empty stomach. Until basic human needs have been met, it is
an illusory expectation that people will desire to play a meaningful role in governance. Meeting those needs frees the citizens from that cycle of wants that have
kept so many Africans outside the sphere of political participation.
The exclusion of broad swaths of African societies from governance is also a
factor that impedes the full realization of democracy. Favoritism to tribe or
128)
129)
130)

Ibid, at 1281.
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ethnicity, or policies that bar distinct portions of the population from taking part
in government, mean that the levers and institutions of government will be insular, self-serving, and undemocratic. Pluralism must replace the policies of exclusion that now prevail in too many African governmental structures: “African states
must promote pluralism, protect human rights, and maximize the participation
of individuals in decision-making. Democracy can thrive in plural societies where
there is social justice, where the government in power seeks to advance the individual and collective well-being of all citizens. Democracy cannot thrive under
exclusivism, where double standards or a ‘divide and rule’ strategy are instruments
of government policy.”131
The African Charter was drafted with all these concerns in mind, and it is wellplaced to clear the hurdles posed by these and either traditional stumbling blocks
to democratization. Beyond the provisions relating to elections and responses to
unconstitutional changes in government, the Charter is overwhelmingly concerned with establishing a political, economic, and social environment in which
democratic institutions can take root and grow. Its objectives and obligations
mandate building, promoting, and protecting those institutions necessary for a
functioning democracy, including an independent judiciary, electoral bodies, and
transparent governmental bureaucracies. It links democratic institution building
with economic and developmental goals, realizing that progress along one metric
will induce progress along the other. It obligates states to create inclusive political
environments where all stake-holders will have a place at the democracy table. It
also seeks to ground democracy in an improved social condition through the
extension of compulsory education, programs to alleviate poverty, hunger, disease, and illiteracy, and the provision of other basic social services. In short, the
Charter recognizes the complex nature of democratic society and the comprehensive reforms states must undertake in order to create an environment conducive
to democracy. In realizing this, and creating one central Charter with robust
enforcement and monitoring mechanisms, the AU and its member states are
well-positioned to advance democratic ideals and principles in sectors of the continent that have yet to enjoy these beneﬁts.
Yet at bottom, the innovative and comprehensive nature of the Charter will
not guarantee the success of its mission. First, more states must ratify the Charter.
Those that have signed but not ratiﬁed, should be strongly encouraged by the AU
to proceed apace with ratiﬁcation, and those ﬁfteen states that have yet to sign
should be similarly encouraged to begin the process of ascension. The goal of
democracy must be shared by all member states of the AU, as instability and
autocracy are a disease that cannot help but infect surrounding states. So long as
there are pockets of undemocratic states, the process of democratization in states
willing to make the transition will be that much more diﬃcult. Second, those
131)
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states that have ratiﬁed the Charter must implement their obligations, and the
AU should be vigilant in reviewing the progress reports submitted by states and
taking whatever measures are necessary to ensure full compliance. Without implementation, the text and objectives of the Charter will become a dead letter. Finally,
the AU and Peace and Security Council, along with other regional actors, must
take a more active role in combating unconstitutional changes in government and
undemocratic regressions, wherever they occur. The AU-response has been a
guessing game of roulette, where suspensions and sanctions are applied in some
cases but not others, with no clear line demarcating those state-situations where
the AU has provided a muscular response and those where it has sat idly by while
democracy has been roll-backed. Where democracy and constitutional government is threatened, the AU must begin the processes outlined by the Charter to
restore constitutional government, and this must be true in all cases falling within
the purview of Articles 24 and 25.

6. Conclusion
Democracy in Africa has come a long way since the end of the Cold War. The
institutions of the African Union have made democratization and the protection
of democracy a priority, and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Governance is only the latest chapter in this unfolding narrative. Success has not,
as yet, matched this commitment. Whether in the lawless reaches of central Africa
or in the still existing autocracies and dictatorships on the continent, democracy
is still only a vague dream for the large majority of Africa’s population.
The comprehensive and holistic approach taken by the Charter is aimed at
clearing those hurdles that have heretofore held back eﬀorts to democratize Africa.
Continent-wide ratiﬁcation of the Charter, full implementation of the obligations contained therein, and an even-handed and consistent approach to situations posing a threat to democracy will go a long way in realizing the objectives
embodied by the African Charter. The dream of democracy has long been a priority of the AU, and the Charter is its best attempt yet at crafting a framework that
could culminate in the realization of that dream. Yet only time will tell whether
the Charter will become simply one more document in a string of ineﬃcacious
pronouncements, or whether it will mark a true turning point in the democratization of Africa.
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